RUSAL joins CNIA

UC Rusal has become a member of the China Nonferrous Industry Association (CNIA), according to a press release today.

It had previously been reported that Rusal’s president Oleg Deripasky had been in Beijing last week for a meeting with the CNIA. But this move was not mentioned in those stories. The press release gives virtually no details of how Rusal met membership criteria, since Rusal owns no smelting assets inside China (plenty across the border of course.)

It’s an unusual move, and I went so far as to describe it as “hopeful” to the Reuters Metal Bulletin reporter who rang me for comment.

CNIA is a government entity. Industry associations in China do not operate in the way we are used to in other countries. Although the CNIA supports industry initiatives, its primary role is the roll-out and execution of government policy. It may seem a little bit of an overkill to set up an industry association for an industry with fewer than 70 entities (which together own about 130 smelters.) But think in terms of steel, where there are thousands of proprietors, and you begin to understand why the government makes use of industry associations. It is also a throwback to the 1990s, when the aluminium industry was entirely government-owned.

To understand the work of the CNIA, recall who it was that led the closure of all China’s Soderberg lines in 2004 and 2005.

Since Rusal has no assets in China (they own 2 cathode plants and a JV with a metals trader), it is hard to understand how they qualified.

And if Rusal expects a “leg up” in promoting sales of metal from their plants into China via the CNIA, it seems a long stretch, from what I can see. In the first place, we have local and provincial governments propping up the industry, keeping smelters open and even funding the re-start of additional capacity, all of which keeps China over-supplied. Second, the last major Sino-Russian deal was the crude oil pipeline, where China has short-changed Russia to the point that the Russian President came to Beijing to complain. Third, it has been a long time since the Chinese took advice from any foreigners, much less the Russians.

To the best of my knowledge, no other foreign companies are members of the CNIA. Alcan may have been, for the short while that they owned their Ningxia plant. Alcoa had a small interest in the Chalco Ping Guo plant some years ago, and now have their strategic alliance with CPIC, but I never hear Alcoa talking about being a member.

But to turn this thing full circle, CNIA is a member of the IAI (IAI’s China production figures come from the CNIA), so Rusal may now be an IAI member twice!

Editor’s note - It was Metal Bulletin who called me, not Reuters.

 

The other side of pot life

Yesterday I received an email from Jim, who is one of the best commodities analysts around (I won’t name him fully, in case it goes to his head). He wanted to confirm what the average pot life is in China, especially for plants that have been around longer than 7 - 10 years.

His question got me thinking.

Many years ago, when I joined Tomago Aluminium as their Raw Materials Manager, just as we were completing my contract negotiations, the plant manager said to me, “Oh by the way, you will also be responsible for SPL.” At that time, I didn’t know how to even spell SPL… A couple of years later, I found out in no uncertain terms, as we shipped several thousand tons of Spent Pot Linings to Italy for processing, along the way spending something like $800 per ton. SPL is a dangerous and hazardous item, with hydrogen, cyanide, arsenic and other nasties.

Now let’s look at the situation in China. Jim reckons the average pot life is about 5 years in China. If we take a 5-year average of total metal production, and use 2 tons per day output, we can roughly estimate the amount of SPL that China produces each year. Let’s assume for this calculation that the average metal production per year has been 15 million tons. That means 41,000t per day, so approximately 20,000 pots in operation at any one time over the last 5 years. If the average life is 5 years, then we can expect that 4,000 pots have been delined and relined per year in that time. Assuming 20t of materials per pot to come out (cathode blocks, refractory materials, sidewalls, etc) then that means that China is generating roughly (very roughly) about 80,000t of SPL per year.

Even if I am 50% out in my calculations, that’s still 40,000t of nasty material that’s probably going into landfill or road base.

SPL is a problem by-product for the world’s aluminium industry. Western companies such as Alcoa have been working on technology solutions for removing the dangerous elements and converting the material into some for of re-usable product, but I shudder to think how the Chinese industry must be dealing with it here. I hope my fears are unfounded.

Reprieve for Point Henry

Word has come through that Alcoa’s Point Henry smelter will get a reprieve for 2 years.

A combined package from the Victorian and Australian governments will inject AU$40 million into the plant. According to a report in the local press, the money will be used for plant upgrades, “staff development” and energy efficiency projects.

But 60 to 65 jobs will go, and Alcoa must operate the plant at the same levels as currently, or risk repaying the government. There was no word on what would happen after the 2 years expires. Presumably there is a view that metal prices would be back up above $2200 - $2400. Point Henry would need that sort of level from the LME for it to be profitable.

Taking the plant capacity of 220,000 tonnes, and splitting the $40 million over 2 years, it represents a reduction in operating costs of about $90 per tonne. With the LME sitting around $1850 (3M), it means there is still a significant distance to get to black ink. Various estimates that we have seen put Point Henry’s operating costs at about $2400. Of course climbing premiums help cover some of that gap, but it certainly seems as if Alcoa has had to at least match the Government package.

It is certainly good news for the local community (declaration of bias - I grew up in that town and worked at Point Henry almost 14 years). Outside the public service, Alcoa is probably the largest employer in the nearby city of Geelong, which has had 2 decades of bad news - financial disasters, manufacturing industry decimated.

The government rescue package pales into insignificance however, when compared to the Henan Government’s rescue package here in China. That package has a price tag of up to US$330 million for 7 months, and protects probably 3,000 jobs, compared to about 540 in Australia, as we discussed in a recent post.

Point Henry’s gain, someone else’s pain?

The news that the various levels of Australian government might step in to save Point Henry must be case of mixed blessings for Alcoa. I suspect it may put them in a difficult situation, when it comes to share price and market outlook. Saving Point Henry means capacity cuts are needed somewhere else.

After announcing capacity cuts at the start of the year, Alcoa has put off the shutdown in Italy and are holding out for lower power costs in Brazil. Now with talk of Point Henry being saved, it leaves them with a total capacity cut which is barely half the 12% they announced at the start of the year. So as they save jobs in Australia, which is great for the workers and the local community, the LME price weighs down further. There is still too much metal on the supply side of the equation.

(Sure, a lot of that metal is now frozen in finance deals, and it could be argued, as one CEO said to me, that a sale to a finance house is as good as a sale to a can company, but if the global economy stutters - not an unlikely scenario - and the contango slips into backwardation, that metal will come out of the finance houses very quickly.)

So Alcoa can only hope for someone else to take a haircut on capacity. But who? Rusal has been talking of capacity cuts for some months, but so far, no action to match the words. Rio is having its operational problems, but is pushing ahead with capacity increases in Kitimat, Cameroon and their new AP60 plant. Middle Eastern smelters are expanding, thanks to low cost energy. And Chinese smelters are now getting subsidies from local governments, which in some cases are 20% of their electricity price.

So as the Australian government works out a lifeline for Point Henry, most likely it will simply mean transferring the pain to another part of the world. Alcoa will need to set the example, as one of the few “aluminium-only” corporations in the top echelon of the aluminium world. They will need to take a haircut somewhere else, reduce the supply side of the equation, and be seen to be matching their words and their actions.

Otherwise, with the LME now heading further south, they risk the perception that they have failed to act decisively. Indeed, some analysts are already downgrading the company’s earnings outlook.

It’s a difficult call for the folks at the New York headquarters.

Deal looming for Point Henry

Australian newspapers this morning are predicting that there will be an announcement as early as this week regarding the future of Alcoa’s Point Henry smelter. And the prediction is that the Victorian State Government, possibly with the assistance of the Australian federal government, will come to the aid of the loss-making smelter.

Alcoa put the smelter under review a few months ago, as part of its review of assets in comparison to the outlook for metal price. Point Henry suffers from age (it is almost 50 years old), the relatively high cost of the Australian dollar, and the combined effects of the cost of electricity and the impending carbon tax (although, to be fair, the carbon tax was not cited as a cause.)

With LME prices below $2000, and the cost of production at Point Henry running well above that, the outlook was grim. Alcoa had been making noises about cutting capacity, in light of the glut of metal stuck in warehouses around the world, though the actual cuts that it has made have been somewhat less than the rhetoric. If a deal is struck in the case of Point Henry, it will be a great day for workers, and the local community (declaration of bias - I grew up there, and spent the first 13 years of my working life at that smelter), but it will do nothing for the dialogue currently under way around the world, that more capacity needs to come out of the global equation.

It will however bring Alcoa a small filip - the metal units from Alcoa that aren’t already committed can go into Japan, where premiums are north of $200. Of course, casting and shipping costs have to come out of the premium, so it’s not like there’s enough in there to make Point Henry tip into the black, but at least Japan premiums are negotiated quarterly, locking in the high price for three months, unlike other markets where premia move daily.

Soon as news comes of any deal for the smelter, we will bring it here.

 

 

All shiny metals look alike…

BHP Billiton has announced that it will merge its aluminium division with its stainless steel materials division, to form a new larger entity within the group.

According to the BHPB website, “… individually, Aluminium and Nickel are small divisions relative to the other businesses in BHP Billiton. The combination of these into a single business unit will provide appropriate scale within the BHP Billiton portfolio, as well as simplifying the functional structure of the business to assist in our efforts to make it a more efficient and competitive organisation.”

In some senses this is a backward move for the aluminium assets. Smelters in Mozambique and South Africa now have to compete with nickel projects for capital, even before the RFA gets past the division heads and on to the corporate board of directors. And two small divisions being merged still don’t make for a big enough voice, compared to the heavy weights in the BHPB portfolio.

It’s part of a general long-term shift in the aluminium industry. We will be talking more about this in our upcoming “Cash Cost Curve” Report (due out very soon), but if you look at who were the big players in aluminium at the turn of this century, you would find (surprise, surprise) aluminium companies. Alcoa, Rusal, Pechiney, Comalco, Chalco - all these companies were focused only on aluminium. So when the boards of directors were planning capital strategies, it was about how to maximise shareholder returns in aluminium.

Now we have Resources companies like Rio Tinto and BHPB controlling portions of the industry, and aluminium companies like Chalco now branching away from the light metal. Chalco is now active in coal, copper, and rare earths. Rio Tinto assesses its aluminium interests in the light of its iron ore and coal and other materials, as does BHPB, and with the poor returns on aluminium in the 12 years since the turn of the century, it’s no surprise that these boards relegate aluminium into a second tier of assets.

Of the heavyweights, only Alcoa and to a lesser extent Hindalco/Novelis have made diversification decisions within the industry, and stayed true to their original purpose.

Watch for more on our CCC report very soon.

 

Rusal to stop buying GPC from China

Unconfirmed reports are coming through that UC Rusal is to cease buying green petroleum coke from China. No details yet, so the rest of this post is speculation. And we speculate that perhaps they are planning to switch to buying more calcined coke and anodes. Rusal already buys some CPC from China, and owns two cathode plants here as well.

If this is true, it would be part of a general trend in the aluminium industry to re-think coke strategy. Following the efforts of Alcoa to establish a JV in a calciner in 2009, there have been several other companies seeking to do something a little different here in China. Late last year, Mubadala signed a JV agreement with ZCGG, who in turn have a partnership with Mitsubishi. Vedanta has been active in the China market, even to the point of telling Weifang Lianxing that they would be a long-term buyer of CPC from that company. Other Chinese companies are being courted by or have already joined with foreign partners for brownfield and even greenfield projects.

All this activity suggests that these aluminium companies are taking the same view as we do here at AZ China - that China is likely to continue to grow in importance as a supplier of coke to the smelter industry. As the companies rush (at snail’s pace in some cases) to join with Chinese partners, those who come to the “feasting table” last may find that there’s nowhere for them to sit and no more coke share to go around. Those not already in a long-term strong relationship with Chinese suppliers are likely to find themselves locked into either the traditional suppliers in the USA, India, or perhaps hang out for additional capacity in the Middle East. Not that calcining or anode producing capacity is ever the key issue - supply of anode quality green coke is. (With an additional wish list of qualities such as reliability, consistency, stable pricing and trust in one’s partners.)

Point Henry to get the chop?

Alcoa yesterday announced that it is reviewing the viability of its smelter at Point Henry. The review is expected to be completed by June, but with the smelter already losing money, and with a strong Aussie Dollar and the prospect of a carbon tax, the likelihood is that the smelter’s days are numbered.

While it makes sense from a macro economic point of view (cut your high cost assets, invest in lower cost assets elsewhere), it has all sorts of repercussions on all sorts of levels.

Point Henry employs around 600 people (it used to have as many as 1,000) and is the biggest employer in the local city Geelong. Geelong was once a major industrial centre, with International Harvester (tractors), Pilkington Glass, Ford Motor Company, Shell Refinery and a host of smaller factories. In those days, the Point Henry smelter was considered as a mid-sized employer. But the effects of manufacturing’s shift to low cost countries, plus some bad financial crashes to local Building Societies, devastated the city. Unemployment skyrocketed, and it took the Government investing in new R&D centres in the area to stop the economic slide. The loss of 600 jobs in Geelong will be catastrophic.

It will also have some folks inside the State Government scratching their heads. The Victorian Government has been providing power to the Alcoa smelters at a discounted price. Point Henry’s power comes from a combination of a small power station in nearby Anglesea, plus from the big power stations on the other side of Victoria. But those power stations run on brown coal, generally considered to be the poorest and most polluting form of thermal coal.

The folks in State Government are therefore probably wondering how a reduction in demand might be used to fullest advantage - if any advantage can be found. Reduced brown coal burning is good for the atmosphere, and reduces the Government’s exposure to green interest groups and carbon tax pressure, but it also reduces Government income. And since smelters provide a useful base load for power stations, the daily peaks and falls of consumption may rise correspondingly.

But of more political concern, the loss of 600 jobs (plus as many as 10 times more in support industries) is likely to equate to the loss of at least 2 seats in Parliament. And they are probably also wondering whether this announcement, and the June timetable, is designed to put pressure on the Government to find ways to further support the smelter. I wonder who will call who first - is the Government waiting for Alcoa to pick up the phone? It’s going to be an interesting discussion on tactics.

Finally, on a personal note, the closure of Point Henry is sad news for me too. I spent almost 14 years in that place. I joined back in the days when Alcoa sent the employees they didn’t want in their US smelters to Australia, to get them out of the way. I remember one guy who walked around the rolling mill with his “nigger knife” quote unquote. Disgusting man. Another, perhaps less disgusting but equally unsuitable, was the Plant Manager, Jack Lang. He was in charge when the plant suffered about 3 months of rolling wildcat strikes, where we staff members were forced to work the day in the office, and the night in the potrooms.

But there were some others who came out from the USA who were genuine gentlemen. I remember P Clarence Ames in the carbon plant, went by his second name because “Who wants to be called Philo?”

But there were plenty of locals who added colour and life to the plant. Rob Helmore, Ken Mansfield, Jock Irvine, Hugh Aspley, Hans Ykema, Phil Robinson, Bob Jennings, Theo Koenings, Mary Donaldson, the Willing twins, and countless others left their mark on my outlook on life in their own ways. I have so many memories, so many fun times, so many dark times (I had a brief stint as the photographer at the worst industrial accidents there), and so much aluminium in my blood as a result of my time there. It will be sad to see the old stamping ground go.

Production cuts in China? A response

Metal Bulletin asked me to jot a few words on my reaction to the recent predictions that Alcoa made as part of their quarterly results announcement.

Perhaps the only other comment I would make, is that it is a mistake to think of China’s aluminium market as being part of a global market. For all intents and purposes, what gets made in China is for Chinese consumption, and the fact that prices in London are higher or lower is almost an accident. Chinese producers like to maximise the China price, keeping the price just below the point where the arbitrage window opens too much. In that respect, the more that Alcoa and RTA and Norsk Hydro and others close capacity, the less likely it is that they will be able to sell metal into China, since the higher London price will keep the arbitrage window closed.

MB published my article Friday. Reprinted here with permission from MB.

Klaus Kleinfeld, Alcoa’s president, won a lot of airplay this week talking about supposed aluminium production cuts on the way in China.

Around 5.7 million tpy of output is operating at a loss and some 1.1 million tpy of capacity could be taken out of the Chinese market this year, he told a conference call after Alcoa released miserable results and announced closures of its own.

This forecast sits snugly in the mainstream consensus on China’s aluminium market, or at least in the consensus coming from the research and PR departments of the world’s aluminium majors.

Rising energy costs and tighter environmental regulation will restrain domestic capacity, they say, opening the gates for imports and propping up world prices.

But it may pay to look at the facts more closely before making – or indeed accepting – predictions like Kleinfeld’s.

Cuts? What cuts?
Plenty of consultants and analysts will tell you the average cost of production in China hovers at around 16,000 yuan per tonne. While this is true, this sort of figure fails as all “averages” do. The average tells you almost nothing.

The highest cost smelter in China is operating at a production cost of around 18,000 yuan per tonne. At that rate, you would expect it to close fairly soon, especially if the outlook for prices is flat or bearish.

But that smelter represents only 100,000 tpy of capacity. Put together all the smelters at a rate above 16,500 yuan per tonne, and there is only 1 million tpy, out of a total 23 million tpy.

At the other end of the scale, there are smelters operating at 12,000 yuan per tonne and below, and – crucially – the new capacity coming into the market in 2012 is all expected to be in this quartile.

In this range from 12,000 yuan to 18,000 yuan (a span of around $1,000) there are about 100 smelters in operation. More than 80 of them are running at 16,500 yuan per tonne or below.

The aluminium price on the Shanghai Futures Exchange has been hovering around 16,000 yuan per tonne for some weeks now, and we have indeed seen some small capacity cuts.

Unless the metal price changes significantly for the worse, it’s hard to imagine why those 80 smelters would be part of the cuts that Kleinfeld predicts.

That does still leave 1 million tpy of capacity, from ten smelters in the highest quartile, at risk of losing too much money to stay afloat. The biggest of those is only 170,000t and the highest amperage only 230kA.

But taking those ten smelters out is only half the story.

There are a large group of new smelters set to join the market through this year. This group will add more than triple the capacity that is presently at the highest risk, to 3 million tonnes: even if Kleinfeld is right, the “net reduction” will actually be an increase of perhaps 2 million tonnes.

The elephant in the room
All this supposes that the metal price remains at around 16,000-16,500 yuan per tonne. Certainly it can’t go higher without a sea change in demand.

There is a lot of speculation that the Chinese government may launch a limited stimulus package focusing on infrastructure development, and speculators and traders are buying up big in the last week or two, betting on the price rising soon. But speculation is just that.

Perhaps the metal price will fall through the support levels of 16,000 yuan per tonne. We know that some smelters, especially in Henan province where the electricity price is very high, are ready to cut output if the price flops to 15,000 yuan per tonne.

But before it gets there, we are likely to see metal moved out of Shanghai market, creating the appearance of supply shortages and boosting the price as a result.

Some people have been pointing to rising Shanghai inventory levels, using it as evidence that China is producing too much metal. The opposite is true. Metal moves into Shanghai because those in long positions are looking to capture profits. Metal moved out of Shanghai last year because the price outside Shanghai was better.

Many analysts operating outside China seem to think that the Shanghai market is the only aluminium market here in China. Far from it. Many traders stay away from Shanghai, fearful of the “elephant in the room” – Chalco.

And it is Chalco that we most need to watch in 2012. They have more than 1 million tonnes of capacity operating at 16,000 or above. They are the worst-placed of all the big corporates in China primary aluminium. CPIC for instance, has all of its capacity operating at 16,000 yuan or below.

But Chalco is the darling of the State Council, and is more than likely than most to follow Party orders about keeping jobs intact rather than worrying about temporary financial losses. Chalco owes the State Council they made a fortune out of the last strategic bail-out in 2009, and the State Council will be aware of that.

One could speculate that this was the real objective of Mr Kleinfeld’s remarks: to taunt a company that is both a shareholder in rival Rio Tinto Alcan, and a competitor in its own right.

But more likely he was looking to talk up his own book, boost metal prices and improve the share value. Certainly, the facts don’t support his claim.


The other shoe falls

Alcoa yesterday announced that its smelters in Spain and Italy will provide the missing 240,000t of capacity from its announcement last week.

Alcoa had announced that 531,000t of capacity would close, but that included 291,000t of pots that were already stopped.

It is bad news for the staff at the plants in those two countries, but employees around the world in other operations would have sighed with relief. Alcoa’s portfolio includes several plants with high operating costs, and the cuts could easily have hit in the USA or Australia as much as in Europe.

But if I were one of those employees, I wouldn’t relax for too long. Taking a net 240,000t out of the supply side is not enough to improve the total market balance. Even with Rio’s operating problems in two plants and union problems in a third, the net reduction has not been enough to pull the LME price out of the doldrums. As Jo Mason (formerly Metal Bulletin, now with Reuters) reported a few days ago, much more severe cuts are needed.